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REVIEWS
RECENT CASE BOOKS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE*
In the course of 1926-27 three elaborate casebooks on Civil
Procedure were published for use in our Law Schools. The first
to reach the reviewer's desk was Keigwin's "Cases in Code
Pleading." A little later, but under the same preface date, May,
1926, Throckmorton's "Cases on Code Pleading" appeared. Magill's "Cases on Civil Procedure" followed before the opening of
the law schools in 1927. All three books come from University
Law Schools in the eastward section of the United States-from
Western Reserve University, from Georgetown University, from
Columbia University. Each shows the care and skill of a professor of law engaged in the actual work of teaching civil procedure.
Naturally these casebooks have much in common. Two of
them deal chiefly with the widespread American system of pleading which is based on the revolutionary principle of the one
form of action. But they all differ in their main points of view
and in their methods of treating the subject. Professor Keigwin's book is distinctively a code pleading work but with its
cases in a quasi-treatise setting-a scholarly, interesting, and
suggestive setting, especially for the teacher. These treatise
features appear in the form of a 29 page "Introductory" to the
whole volume and in a series of "Summaries of Doctrine," for
eight of ten main heads-The Merger of Law and Equity, The
Abolition of Actions, Parties to Actions, The Joinder of Actions,
The Complaint, The Demurrer, The Answer, The Reply. The
general purpose of the Summaries "is to put the student in possession of so much historical matter as will enable him to understand the genesis of the system which he is about to acquire, and
also to indicate by comparison with the older method the reasons
for the reform and the extent of the departure from pre-existing
institutions." Manifestly, so the learned editor tells us in his
preface, "if the merits of the reform are to be adequately appreciated, the characteristic features of Code pleading must be
intelligently compared with the institutions which those features
have displaced. Such comparison requires a certiin historical
retrospect and certain restatements of common law methods,
which must be understood in any useful estimate of the superseding prescriptions."
With most of the Summaries there are given also very briefly
stated cases in illustration of the Summary or as ancillary to
Code Pleading. By Charles A. Keigwin. Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co.: Rochester. Pages xxii, 856. 1926. Price $5.00.
Cases on Code Pleading. By Archibald H. Throckmorton, St. Paul,
Pages xiii, 899. 1926. Price $5.50.
West PublishingCo.
Cases on Civil Procedure. By Roswell Magill. St. Paul: West Publishing Co. Pages viii, 578. 1927. Price $5.00.
*Cases in
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more fully stated principal cases under the same heading. Compared with the latter, these ancillary cases, well selected and
valuable to the doctrine, sometimes make a considerable proportion of all the cases under the head in question. Their aggregate for the whole casebook runs to some 70 cases as against
about 300 principal cases.
The primary purpose of the work, as stated by its editor, "has
been to develop the distinctive features of the Code method and
to put the principal stress upon those matters wherein the statutes establish variation from the modes of the common law. The
reader will therefore find his attention frequently invited to certain of the original institutions, with which his acquaintance is
presumed, and in respect of which the statute has adopted a different doctrine and prescribed a diverse procedure." And the
editor's endeavor "has been to represent practice under the
codes as it actually and generally is" with local diversities disregarded.
It is noteworthy in the principal cases that the statements of
facts as given in the official reports are often cut very closely,
if not perilously, in our casebook. An illustration appears in the
case of City of Syracuse v. Hogan (1923), 234 N. Y. 457, as
given on page 98 of Keigwin's cases. In the official report Judge
McLaughlin states the allegations of the complaint and of the
answer, the steps in the trial, and the question certified to the
Court of Appeals. The judge's statement covers about two pages
of the official report. It affords the student an unusually attractive opportunity to show his skill and command of the case
in an attempt for himself, after he reads and rereads all the
case, to make an even more plain and concise statement of material facts, all the material facts, and none but the material
facts, before the court in the case at bar. It is a worth while
effort for a student of a case, as distinguished from a reader of
it. But this work our casebook does for the student, in a statement of half a page, including the result reached in the Court
of Appeals. This statement of facts is well done. No doubt it
has the merit of saving time and saving space. A reader of the
casebook should be grateful; he can get through a larger number of cases in a morning than if he had to work out for himself a summary statement of the facts of each of them. But does
not the casebook, in this method, take an important and profitable piece of work away from the student who is seeking a
training in habits of legal thought, as distinguished from the
reader who is seeking primarily information about the case?
Another illustration, taken somewhat at random, appears in
Bruheim v. Stratton (1911), 145 Wisc. 271, as presented in
Keigwin's cases, p. 315. In the official report Judge Kerwin,
delivering the majority opinion, states, briefly enough, the allegations of the complaint and of the answer, the question before
,the court, the defendant's contention that Dessert Lumber Co. v.
Wadleigh, (1899), 103 Wisc. 318, applies, the judge's reasons
for holding that this case does not apply, and the distinction
which he draws between it and the case at bar and that the judg-
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ment below, which was for the defendant, must be reversed. In
a dissenting opinion Judge Barnes states with fair fullness his
reasons for holding that the Dessert Lumber Co. case is sound
in principle and on authority that on its facts it cannot be distinguished from the case at bar and that the judgment should
be for the plaintiff. Taken as a whole, with both its majority
and its dissenting opinion, Bruheim v. Stratton is an unusually
fine selection for a casebook on Code pleading. It affords an
opportunity not only for an effort by the student to make a plain
and concise statement of the material facts of the case, of the
way it reached the court, of the question before the court, of the
answer which the court gave to the question, but also for a
reason whether the answer given by the majority or the answer
given by the dissenting opinion is sound in law.
This opportunity our casebook takes away, in large part, from
the student. The statement of facts, substituted for the court's
statement, is given in a summary form which in itself is excellent but which leaves the student no opportunity to try his hand
at it. The dissenting opinion, which is especially valuable in
connection with the facts of this case and the reasoning of the
majority opinion, is not given at all. The Dessert Lumber Co.
case is, it is true, given elsewhere in the casebook. The instructor can start an inquiry on the part of his class whether the
opinion in the Lumber Company case or the majority opinion
in Bruheim v. Stratton is to be preferred but this affords no such
stimulation or ground of inquiry as is afforded by the dissenting
opinion in Bruheim v. Stratton itself.
Professor Throckmorton's volume is distinctively a Code
pleading casebook. With the exception of an eight page introduction on the rise and spread of Code pleading, its effect in the
Federal courts, its characteristics and its revisions, his 884 pages
of text show no treatise features. The material facts of a case,
the decisive question in it, how this question was reached, and
with what final result, can be ascertained only from a careful
reading of the whole case as given in the casebook. A student's
search for possible distinctions between the case and other cases
under the same head in the casebook, and their bearings on the
doctrine in hand is without the aid of treatise summaries or
short order ancillary cases. An analytical summary of the doctrine under consideration there should be, of course, but it is for
the student to work it out. The process may be slow, the mistakes may be serious; but under the stress of class room discussion, and the questioning of a law teacher not given over to lecturing, the result for the earnest student will be worth the time
and the effort. In the outcome he will have a mastery of the
principle involved and a valuable experience in the thinking
which goes into the making of a lawyer.
The text cases, running to the number of 331, are arranged
under three main divisions, Parties, Joinder and Splitting of
Causes of Action, The Pleadings. The last division is much the
most extensive. It includes six chapters, three of which aggregate 19 distinct sections, with definite divisions of some of
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these sections. One chapter is given to the subject of Motions.
In Common Law pleading, the motion based on the pleading had
a limited range; in these modern days, however, it is of wide
and growing importance. Although some excellent casebooks
on Code pleading give the Motion no separate treatment, its
right to a distinct chapter seems to be very clear.
Two features are notable in the 331 text cases in Professor
Throckmorton's book, their wide field of selection and the number of them which have appeared since 1900. Of the 28 states
which have adopted the Code, 25 appear in the selected cases.
The larger number comes from New York, with 101 cases from
its courts. But the trans-Mississippi states are well represented.
California has 14 cases, Minnesota 13, Missouri 18, South Dakota 11, Oregon and Oklahoma each 14. Possibly the spirit of
Code pleading has had freer opportunity west of the Mississippi.
The large number of cases this side of the year 1900 and the
necessary limits of a casebook planned for about 72 hours of
class room work have resulted in the exclusion from the text
of a number of landmark cases. The teacher will miss more
than one old friend.
Two other features of the book are deserving of notice. It
gives at the opening of the more important chapters the text of
the enactments in a representative number of the Codes, east
and west. These enactments are selected both from some of the
older Codes and from the recent New York Civil Practice Act,
"not only for the purpose of portraying the present law of New
York but also for the purpose of stimulating discussion as to
possible improvements in the Codes of other states." Throughout the book there are, valuable case notes referring to other
cases and to articles in the late law periodicals which touch on
the distinctions involved.
Professor Magill's book differs from the other two in its objective although it deals with a number of subjects which are of
fundamental importance in Code pleading. Its aim is however
to provide a scientific casebook for a first year procedure course.
Its selections, including about 50 Code cases, are presented in the
light of Common Law rules of pleading and the Forms of Action.
It seeks in common law pleading the key "to an understanding of
the requirements, the possibilities, and the limitations, both expressed in the statute and inherent in judicial experience, of
modern Codes and Practice Acts."
The almost simultaneous appearance of these three carefully
prepared books may be due to a commendable courage on the
part of their law publishers or to a fortunate accident. But the
event itself may be significant of coming good. We have 28
Code states. In all of them the courts are deciding, and have
long been deciding, cases arising out of direct or inferred statutory provisions common, for the most part, to the different
Codes of civil procedure. These decisions, in most Code states,
now run through two generations. Apparently we have reached
a time when a thorough study of these principles as thus worked
out in many jurisdictions will give us the long desired and
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greatly needed scientific Code of Procedure under the principle
of One Form of Action. But this work cannot be done in the
law offices. It can be done in the law schools if sufficient time
and effort can be found there for the undertaking. It would
serve a useful end if Professor Magill's book could be used as a
first year book, to be followed by Professor Throckmorton's
book in either the second or the third year.
CHARLES M. HEPBURN.
Indiana University School of Law.
THE LAW OF AVIATION*
With the enormous development of the science of aviation
which has occurred in the past decade, it is not surprising that
the legal aspects of this subject should now come under consideration. It needs no prophet to see that aviation is going to
raise some extremely difficult legal problems and that legislatures, administrative authorities and courts will all be called
upon to assist in working out a code of rules for regulating this
activity. The book under review is an attempt to bring to
gether all that has already been done in this field and to suggest,
by references to cases and other authorities which cover more
or less analogous situations, the line of legal development which
may reasonably be expected.
As already indicated, there are as yet almost no legal decisions
on the subject of aviation and the text of the book, except in so
far as it merely summarizes legislative and administrative acts,
is perhaps subject to the criticism of being somewhat speculative. However, the author can hardly be blamed for his failure
to cite definite authorities as to questions upon which no such
authorities exist. And it is believed that his conclusions are
reasonably consistent not only with analogous cases but with
the line of the development which the law should take. The
views of the author seem to have been arrived at with due regard for the two fundamental principles which must govern
aviation law-i. e., the desirability of developing the scientific
and practical aspects of this activity and the protection of the
non-flying public. The proper balancing of these two considerations is undoubtedly the chief task in the development of aviation law and the author's suggestions should furnish assistance
to the courts and other authorities in reaching desirable results.
The two most important subjects discussed are the sovereignty
in air space and the right to navigate over the land of another
person. As to the first of these, the author's conclusion that
sovereignty is absolute and permits the regulation or even prohibition of flying over any part of the territorial jurisdiction,
seems clearly sound. His opinion on the other point, that there
is a legal right to sail over the land of another private individual,
seems also correct, with the restriction (which the author him*The Law of Aviation. By Rowland W. Fixel. Matthew Bender & Company. Albany, N. Y. 1927. Pages xv, 403. Price $7.50.

